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CHARLES HEINLIN, 
Petitioner and Appellant, 
-vs»-
SAMUEL W. SMITH, Warden, 
Utah State Prison, 
Respondents 
) Case No* 13790 
BRIEF OP APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This i s an appeal from a judgment and order entered by the Honorable 
Stewart M. Hanson, Judge of the Third Judicial Dis tr ic t Court, dismissing 
petitioner-appellant*s petit ion for Writ of Habeas Corpus upon the merits, 
on March 26, 1975* 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case carae on regularly for hearing before the Honorable Stewart 
M. Hanson, Judge of the Third Judicial Distr ict Court, on March 25, 1975* 
After hearing, Judge Hanson issued an Order dismissing petitioner-appellant*s 
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus upon the merits thereof• 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the lower court's judgement and order 
dismissing appellant's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus upon the merits* 
*"
 x
 — ***<"» ^a+A-hioner's 
Petition and releasing petitioner, or, in the alternative, granting 
petitioner a new tr ia l from his conviction in the lower court. 
STATEMENT OF PACTS 
Petitioner-appellant was charged by Informau tion before the Honorable 
Allen B. Sorensen, Distr ict Judge,Fouxth Judicial Distr ict Court, with the 
crime of "Theft" in violation of Sections, 7o-6-i*04 and 76-6-412, Utah 
Code Annotated (1953)* 
At t r i a l , petitioner-appellant's cour-b-appointed counsel fai led to 
object to or move to suppress certain admissions made by the defendant and 
received into evidence at t r i a l , even though such admissions were arguably 
excludable and clearly damaging to defendant's case. Further, defendant's 
appointed counsel neglected to present an arguably tenable affirmative 
defense of "Mental Defect" on behalf of defendant. In addition, defendant's 
appointed counsel fai led to request an Instruction on the included Mis-
demeanor offense of "Depriving an Owner of his Vehicle", although such de-
fense was arguably supportable by the evidence. Finally, defendant's 
court appointed counsel neglected to apprise defendant of his right to 
appeal in the matter. 
Appellant was subsequently tried to a jury before the court on the 
charge of "Theft" and on October 10, 1973, the jury found appellant guilty 
of the charged offense of "Theft" under the above cited Sections, and a 
judgment and conviction for that offense was subsequently entered by Judge 
Sorensen. 
On November 16, 1973* appellant was sentenced by Judge Sorensen to 
serve an indeterminate term in the Utah State Penitentiary of from 1 to 
15 years. No appeal was f i led in the matter. 
On February 4, 1974, petitioner-appellant f i led a Petition for Writ 
of Habeas Corpus in the Third Judicial Distr ict Court, Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, alleging as one of several grounds for re l i e f that the 
defendant-petitioner was denied at tr ia l the right to the affective _.• 
assistance of counsel in the preparation of his defense. Upon hearing 
thereon, Judge Stewart M. Hanson, Sr . , Distr ict Judge of the Ihird Judicial 
Distr ict Court, by order dismissed petitioner-appellant1s Petition on the 
merits. Prom that judgment and order of dismissal appellant brings this 
direct appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT PETITIONER'S PETITION 
FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS SINCE PETITIONER WAS DENIED AT TRIAL 
THE RIGHT TD THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IK THE PREPARATION 
AND PRESENTATION OF HIS DEFENSE 
I t i s well established as a matter of law that the defendant in a 
criminal proceeding i s entit led to have the aid of effective ^counsel :•---
in his defense. Jaramillo v. Turner, 24 Utah 2d 19i 465 P. 2d JkJ (1970); 
Alires v. Turner, 22 Utah 2d 118, 4^9 P* 2d 241 (1969); People v. Seger, 
i405 H I . 222, 90 N. E. 2d 637 (1950)1 People v> Hughes, 57 Gal 2d 89, # 7 
P. 2d 33(l96l)J B»ple v. DeSimone, 9 111* 2d 522, I38 N. E. 2d 556t (See 
also the cases collected under 157 A.L.R. 1226). 
In this jurisdiction, the standard for competent counsel i s enunciated 
in Alires v» Turner, supra, wherein Justice Crockett said: 
The (due process) requirement (of counsel) i s not sat isf ied by a 
sham or pretense of an appearance in the record by fln atit/r*n*Y 
who mafllfegtB J\9 P**1 *nwrwm ftbft^fj^^ ar^mgri . 
(W) P* 2d a t 243). 
Similarly, in Jaramillo v. Turner, supra, this court said: 
(an allegation of incompetent counsel only arises when) . • • 
there has been such a flagrant ahus,ft,»ofL W a l nmoedure as to 
amo""t frt-^ -faUh. *n "the P 8 ^ of the lawyer. (24 Utah 2d a t 
the facts in the instant case, i t i s clear that the above s e t forth 
requirements of due process have not been sat isf ied in the instant case, 
and that the petitioner-appellant's defense was nothing more that a 
sham and bad faith pretense of defense presented by an attorney unwilling 
to venture even a minimal effort on his c l i ent ' s behalf* This conclusion 
i s borne out by the following facts brought to l i ght in the Habeas Corpus 
proceeding from which this Appeal i s brought: 
Petitioner-Appellant's counsel fai led to object to or move to 
suppress certain alleged admissions made by the defendant and 
received into evidence a t tr ia l in the matter, even though grounds 
for such objection or Motion to Suppress existed in that the 
police obtained such admissions after the defendantrequested 
the assistance of counsel prior to questiofSby police* 
At tr ia l in the original criminal proceeding against defendant^tes-fc-
imony was had to the effect that defendant made certain admissions to 
the police respecting his involvement in the crime alleged to have been 
committed by him# (Tr. I , PR 28-29)• Such jtest*mr>ny wy| rftg^u^d^lnitt 
ej^derjga^^ 
fact that t g ^ ^ to the ef fect that such 
statements mad^^ assistance of 
c o u r ^ be BKMent 
before questioning vSS&§S^^^JL3!r* I*P* ty)* 
Counsel need not belabor here the fact that such statements, i f 
defendant's testimony be believed, were clearly excludable as evidence either 
upon objection stated at the time of t r ia l or upon a Motion to Suppress, 
under the rationale of Miranda v# Aizona, 38^ UtS., 436 (1966)* (See also 
the many cases discussing'the "Miranda" principle s e t forth in 10 A#L*R# 
3rd IO54)• Ihe failure by defendant's counsel to object or move to suppress 
such obviously injurious tes&mony constitutes a clear indication that 
counsel was either unaware of the ••Miranda11 principle or unconcerned with 
the consequences to defendant of the receipt into evidence of such 
admissions* 
B* 
Defendants counsel fai led to present the defense of "Mental Defect11 
under Utah Code Annotated 76-2-305 (1953) t although such defense was 
tenable, available and known to counsel* 
At t r ia l on the original criminal proceeding, defendant^ counsel did 
not present the defense of "Mental Defect" 'available under 76-2-305, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953* Under Utah Code Annotated 76-2-308 and 76-1-504 such 
a defense i s deemed an affirmative defense requiring presentation of 
evidence by defendant a t tri&l* This action by defendants counsel was 
clearly negligent and i l l -tuned t o , i f not clearly inconsistant with,the 
needs of defendant* 
One need only read the t r ia l transcript containing the defendants 
account of the events on the occasion of the commission of the alleged crime, 
and to read the account of the defendants behavior given by the arresting 
officer on the occasion of the arrest of defendant, to know that something 
i s seriously amiss, and to know that defendant was quite obviously 
suffering then, as he i s now, from a completely delusional view of the world* 
(Tr. 28-29* 47)* 
That notwithstanding, defendants counsel chose to ignore this obvious 
defense and did not present any evidence at tr ia l supportive of such defense 
such as the testimony of psychiatrists, etc* This i s , we contend, yet 
another indication that defense counsel fai led in this duty to effect ively 
represent defendant in this matter* 
c 
Defendants counsel failed to request an Instruction on the 
included Misdemeanor offense of "Depriving an Owner of his 
Vehicle" under Utah Code Annotated 41-1-109 (1953)> although 
the evidence presented at trial arguably supported such 
Instruction* 
Section 41-1-109 provides in pertinent parts 
Any person who drives a vehicle, not his own, without the consent 
of the owner thereof and with intent temporarily to deprive said 
owner of such vehicle, without intent to steal the same^is guilty 
of a misdemeanor* 
At trial in the criminal proceeding, the evidence presented disclosed 
that the defendant dispossessed the owner thereof of a motor vehicle and 
drove said vehicle away. Defendant was charged with and convicted of the 
offense of Theft of an operable motor vehicle under Utah Code Annotated 
76-6-404 awd ?6-6-4l2, a Felony* Arguably, defendant might, under the 
facts and circumstances presented to the jury of the lesser included offense 
of "temporarily depriving an owner of possession" under 41-1-109* Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953* had the jury had an opportunity to do so* If this 
is the case, then obviously defendants counsel breached his duty to 
defendant to effectively represent defendants interests in failing to 
request such Instruction and present the argument to the jury that defendant 
should be convicted of the Misdemeanor rather than the felony offense* 
D. 
Defendant's court-appointed counsel failed and neglected to properly 
advise defendant of his right to appeal from his conviction* 
Upon hearing on petitioner-appellant's Petition for Writ of Habeas 
Corpus, counsel entered into a stipulation on the recordthat defense counsel 
had never discussed with petitioner his right to appeal from his conviction 
and that the tr ia l court had never advised defendant of such right* No 
appeal was taken from defendants conviction* 
I t i s well established as a matter of law that an indigent defendant 
i s entitled to representation upon appeal, and that his right to appeal 
must be safeguarded by appointive counsel as well as the court* 
Swenson v. Bosler, 386 U.S. 258 (1967); 
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967)5 
Douglas v . California, 372 U.S. 353 U9630* 
In the Instant case, we contend that the failure of defense counsel 
or the court to apprise defendant of his right to appeal and his right to 
have counsel upon appeal constitutes yet another indication that defendants 
appointed counsel fai led in bis duty to properly safeguard defendant's 
r ights . While counsel may not have f e l t that defendant had grounds upon 
which to bring appeal, we contend that he had an affirmative duty, under 
the above cited authorities, to apprise defendant of his right to appeal, 
to have counsel on appeal, etc* His failure to do so , we contend, constitutes 
yet another indication of his T*ad-faith lack of concern for defendant's 
rights in this matter. 
Prom the above recited points i t should be immediately apparent that 
1 
defendant was denied at t r ia l his right to the assistance of effective counsel j 
In the preparation and presentation of his defense. As noted above, 
defendant's court-appointed counsel fai led in four particulars to properly 
represent defendant a t t r ia l in the matter. Ihe cumulative ef fect of these 
four errors of omission was, we contend, to render the t r ia l a sham and 
pretense of appearance by an attorney who manifested no real concern for 
the interestsof the accused. This court should reverse the decision of the 
tr ia l court upon petit ioner's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, and either 
remand this matter for a new tr ia l or, in the alternative, order petit ioner's 
immediate release. 
CONCLUSION 
Ihe t r ia l court erred in dismissing the petit ioner's pet i t ion for a 
Writ of Habeas Corpus since petitioner was denied at t r ia l the right to 
the effective assistance of counsel in the preparation and presentation 
of his defense. This court should reverse the ruling and judgment of the 
tr ia l court and either order petit ioner's immediate release or, in the 
alternative, order a new tr ia l for petitioner* 
Respectfully submitted, 
tioner-Appellant 
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